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Mud of Janus bin's professional life has been devoted to studying the
interrelationship between the goeds arx financial markets. His general
equilibrium açroathes stresses the interaction of the desiar1 for financial
assets with the decision to a<xuim.ilate preductive capital. His enp-asis on
q,theratio of market value of assets to their replacement cost, has shaped
hc stedents of the aggrepte econc*uy uzerstard the link between the stcok
market ani fixed investment.
This paper examines the empirical linkage between fundamental returns on
cxrporate assets and market return on financial claii on those
assets. It defines the fundamental return as real cash flew divided by
replacement cost. It examines whether the market return on irdividual firms
respord mere to aggregate shocks to the fundamental return or to the market
return itself. It then examines whether aregate market risk or aggreqate
fundamental risk is priced. Although market risk is priced, the paper does
find that fundamental risk is an important factor in explaining risk premia.
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New Haven, CT 06520—2125LT]he daily revaluations of the Stock Exchange, though
they are primarily made to facilitate transfers of old
investments between one individual and another,
inevitably exert a decisive influence on the rate of
current investment. For there is no sense in building
up a new enterprise at a cost greater than that at which
a similar existing enterprise can be purchased; whilst
there is an inducement to spend on a new project what
may seem an extravagant sum, if it can be floated off on
the Stock Exchange at an immediate profit.
General Theory, Ch. 12.
This quotation from Keynes must be among Jim Tobin's favorites. Tobin
traces the origins of his own thinking about the importance of market
valuation for investment to Keynes. He also insists that as students we
read that rich and fertile discussion of the relation of long term
expectations and confidence to investment in Chapter 12. There Keynes
suggests that the market gives noisy signals about fundamentals. But in the
rest of the General Theory, rather than emphasize the required rate of
return on capital, Keynes instead focusses on thrateof interest. Most of
the profession followed him. Hence, for many of us it was reading Tobin's
"Money, Capital and Other Stores of Value" that provided the moment of
insight. It is one of those articles--simple, lucid and insightful--that
permanently shifts ones perspective. Before we read it we were dimly aware
that there was something unsatisfactory about treating financial claims and
physical capital as one and the same, with a single interest rate giving the
terms on which society would hold the stock of non-monetary wealth. After,-2-
it was obvious that the two differed in essential respects, that their
rates of return would not always move together, and that it was not even
self evident that increases in the stock of government debt were
contractionary
No one has been more insistent than Tobin about the importance of the
stock and bond markets, markets for claims on physical assets, in providing
guides to investment and an indication of the incentives for capital
formation, nor has anyone contributed more to our understanding of the way
monetary policy and financial institutions affect those markets. But it is
also hard to find anyone who is more skeptical of those markets accurately
reflecting fundamental returns on capital and wealth owners' preferences.
Another of Tobin's favorite quotations is also from Chapter 12, where Keynes
likens the stock market to "newspaper competitions in which the competitors
have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the
prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds
to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole."
Only Tobin knows when his interest in the distinction between the
returns on physical and financial assets first developed. From his writings
one would guess that the importance of the idea grew while he was on leave
in 1959. It plays a central motivating role in his manuscript, largely
written that year, in which he filled so much of Hicks's prescription for
monetary theory. In that manuscript, much of what was subsequently
published in a series of classic articles, he discusses systematically the
different characteristics of assets, their liquidity, reversibility,
maturities and nominal and real risks. He analyzes the importance of those
characteristics to the decisions of households, firms and financial-3-
institutions in making their allocation of wealth among different assets.
Tobin's belief in the need to distinguish among the returns on his "minimum
menu" of assets leads him, in the manuscript and in a succession of papers
written by himself and together with students and colleagues, to develop a
whole family of models of the balance sheet in which monetary events
influence, but are not the sole determinants of the terms on which society
is willing to hold its wealth.
This logic led Tobin to be skeptical of ftinterestrate as an
accurate measure of the required returns on the entire menu of diverse
assets populating the portfolios of private agents. This skepticism led him
to search for a more appropriate measure than the bond rate for calibrating
the stimulus to investment demand. In his theoretical work, he first
emphasized the required rate of return on capital, the marginal revenue
product of capital which would make wealth owners content to hold capital at
its replacement cost, and thenq ,withits several attractions. Not
only can q be measured, it avoids the need to measure separately expected
profitability, risk premia and discount rates, and it can be used to measure
both incentive and wealth effects.1
In spite of his skepticism about the efficiency of the stock market,
Tobin looks for explanations of the market value of firms, and hence q and
the required rate of return on capital, in terms of fundamental
characteristics--for example, the expected values and risks of firms'
earnings and measures of bankruptcy risk--rather than in terms of the
distribution of market returns themselves. This approach has several
1 . . Thevariable q was introduced into macroeconomic analysis by Brainard
and Tobin (1968) and Tobin (1969). Ciccolo (1975) and Brainard and Tobin
(1977) are early empirical implementations of the q-theory of investment.-4-
related advantages. It focusses on the social outcomes that are being
valued, it reduces the extent to which market adjustments to equilibrium
contaminate estimates of the expected returns and the distribution of
returns, and it provides the basis for estimating the extent to which market
adjustments themselves are an important component of what gets valued.
In this paper, we examine the explanatory power of market and
fundamental factors for risk premia on marketed claims on physical capital.
For a panel of non-financial, non-extractive firms we examine the level and
distribution of the physical returns and compare them to the level and
variability of the financial returns on the marketed claims of the firm. In
Section 1, we discuss measurement of fundamental and market value of a
firm. We take the fundamental return on the firm to be the ratio of the net
cash flow to the replacement cost of its physical assets. In Section 2, we
compare this fundamental return to the return and risk faced by an investor
who holds the aggregate stocks and bonds of the firm. We discuss how to
estimate the risk premia and risk free rate implied in the variation in
expected return across firms, assuming arbitrage pricing holds. In Section
3, we then estimate the risk-loading and the prices of risk for both market
and fundamental factors. Thus, in the spirit of the asset pricing
literature, we study the factors that explain rates of return. But in the
spirit of Tobin's work, our object is to examine the explanatory power of
fundamentals.-5-
1.Replacement Cost. Market Value, and Fundamental Return
In this section, we discuss estimates of replacement cost, market
value, and fundamental rates of return. These data allow us to compare
market and fundamental returns at the firm level.
A.Data and Variables
The calculations in this paper are based on accounting and financial
data for individual firms. Our data represent the 191 firms in non-
petroleum, non-extractive industries on the Compustat tape from 1962 through
1985. We required that the data for key variables not be missing for a firm
2
to be included in the sample.
The firms report capital stocks, inventories, and debt at book value.
We now discuss how we adjust these data to measure replacement cost, market
value, and fundamental return.
Physical Capital and Depreciation: Firms report nominal investment and
book value of depreciation. Based on these data, we estimate the age
composition of the capital stock by fitting the implied book depreciation to
that reported by firms subject to the constraint that investment less
retirements sum to the book value of the gross capital stock. To convert
current dollar capital stocks and depreciations into constant dollars, we
use the BEA's industry-specific capital stock price indexes.
Inventory valuation: Firms report inventories at book value. We
estimate their replacement cost using two-digit output price deflators and
the firms's accounting methods. Other aasets carried on the books at
2More detail about variable construction is available in the conference
draft of the paper.-6-
historical cost are treated like LIFO inventories. Because revaluation of
these assets has been such a major part of changes in value of petroleum and
other extractive companies, we have excluded firms in these industries in
the results reported here.
Replacement Cost: Replacement cost is defined as the sum of the
capital stock and inventories and other assets.
Market Value: The market value of the firm is the sum of the market
values of its preferred stock, common stock and debt, less net short term
financial assets valued at par. The market value of debt is estimated from
information about book values, interest payments and maturity structure.
In a procedure similar to the one we use for the capital stock, we fit our
estimated maturity structure of debt to the reported interest payments.
Market values for each vintage of debt are then computed using McCulloch's
(1990) bond prices.3
Cash Flow: Cross cash flow is reported income plus interest payments
on long-term debt plus book depreciation minus the inventory valuation
adjustment. For net cash flow, we subtract economic depreciation.
Fundamental Rate of Return: We define the fundamental rate of return
as the ratio of cash flow to replacement cost, either net orgross of
economic depreciation.
B. Summary of Returns and Valuation Data
Table 1 sulnnarjzes the fundamental rates of return, net andgross and
3These areTreasury bond prices. Hence, our calculations presume that
there is a constant premium of Treasury over corporate bonds.-7.
before and after tax, for our sample of 191 firms.4 For comparison, we
include the net of corporate tax and depreciation rate of return series for
the aggregate corporate sector. The net rates of return are inherently
real. An economic depreciation allowance is deducted from cash flow; this
deduction is the amount of cash flow that must be reinvested just to
maintain thà capitaTstock.
All of the series peak in 1965 through 1968 and in 1972 through 1974.
The before tax series for both gross and net rate of return fall more over
the sample than the after corporate income tax series, consistent with the
fact that the corporate tax wedge fell over the 1963 to 1985 period.5 For
example, the average of the net before tax real rate of return fell 1.2
percentage points more than the corresponding after tax rate. The average
net before tax rate was 13.3 percent for 1966 through 1970, increased
slightly to 13.6 percent for 1971 through 1975, fell to 12.4 for 1976
through 1980, and finally fell to 9.1 percent for 1981 through 1985. The
average of the net after tax rate fell from 7.7 percent for 1966 through
1970, to 6.3 percent in 1971 through 1975, to 5.3 percent in 1976 through
1980, and to 4.7 percent for 1981 through 1985. This decline was not as
noticeable in Erainard, Shoven, and Weiss (1980) where the calculations
ended in 1977 and is also not as dramatic in our estimates of the aggregate
net after tax rate of return show-n in the last column. For this series the
41n the tables, the aggregates of our firm data are reported as
weighted averages where the weights are given by the fraction of the firms
net replacement cost in aggregate replacement cost. Consequently, the
reported returns are for holding the aggregate of claims on our sample of
firms. The standard deviation is the square root of the weighted squared
deviations from means. The weights are recalculated each year.
5Most of the tax charges during this period relate to changes in the
treatment of depreciation, hence are likely to be reflected per unit of capital.-8-
decline appears to have taken place by the early 1970's. In part this
difference may reflect the fact that our sample excludes extractive
industries and financial firms, while the aggregate figures include them.
The cross-sectional standard deviation of our rate of return series is
large and varies somewhat over the 23 years of our sample.6 The standard
deviation of the net after tax figures was nearly 80 percent of the
average for the sample as whole. The average of firms' standard deviation
of returns across time is reported in the last row of Table 1. For the net
after tax return a typical firm's net rate of return has a time-series
standard deviation of 3.2 percent, while the dispersion across firms in a
given year is typically around 5 percent. Hence, although a substantial
portion of the dispersion of returns across firms could reflect the large
dispersion of individual firm's returns around the firm's average,
differences in means across firms appear to be important. The increased
dispersion of returns across firms in the l980's suggests that firms'
fundamental returns have become more variable while theiraverage
performance has worsened.
Table 2 shows the weighted average and dispersion ofq for our sample
of firms. The table also gives a reference series forq from the 1983
Economic Report of the President. Our q series correspondsclosely with
that of the Economic Report of the President. Theq series suggests that
assets on average were selling as muth as 60 percent above replacementcost
in the mid-1960's, whereas by 1981 they were selling, forour sample, at
half price. Our figures indicate that by the end of 1985average q had
6The cross-sectionalstandard deviations are calculated by taking the
weighted average of the squared deviations from means for a given period.
The weights are the share in the denominator of theparticular return.-9-
recovered to about 0.8. From calendar years 1985 to 1987, the New York
Stock Exchange composite index rose 50 percent. Assuming increases in
nominal replacement cost of between 5 and 10 percent per year over that
period would imply that q was between 1.1 and 1.2 during 1987.
2.Market and Fundamental Rates of Return
In this section of the paper we compare market returns on the financial
claims on the firms and the fundamental rate of return on their physical
assets. The market rate of return is measured by the stock return and the
V total market return. We define the total market return (rj) as the return
to owning a share of the entire firm, that is, a leverage-weighted average
of a firm's stocks and bonds. If the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds, the
expectation of total market return corresponds to the required rate of
return relevant to a firm's investment decisions about projects with the
same expected returns as its existing projects. In those circumstances, the
distribution of returns and risks between stockholders and bondholders is of
no relevance to the investment decision or the total value of the firm, and
the required rates on stocks and bonds separately are not directly relevant
to the firm's decisions.
Distributions of these market returns are contrasted with the
distribution of the fundamental returns on firms' capital. We define the
fundamental return (r) as the after tax net of depreciation cash flow of
the firm divided by the net replacement cost of its physical assets.
Table 3 reports the market and fundamental returns for our panel of
firms and for the aggregate corporate sector. The first column in Table 3- 10-
repeatsfrom Table 1 the information on the distribution of the net rate of
return on capital after tax, our measure of the fundamental real rate of
return on the physical assets of the firm. The following columns report
distributional information on the market rates across firms and time.
Inspection of these series shows that fundamental return varies much less
over time and across firms than the various market rates. We return later
to an investigation of the extent to which market rates of return are
related to the fundamental.
A firm considering expansion of its physical capital stock, or an
observer who wants to understand how markets value fundamentals, should
compare the firm's fundamental return with the return required by owners of
the firm's stock and long term debt. The expected value of the total market
return is a natural measure of the cost of funds relevant to the demand for
capital. To our knowledge no one has ever attempted to use directly an
estimate of that expected rate. In Table 3 we report estimates of the total
market return calculated as the sum of dividends (common and preferred),
interest, and capital gains or losses on a firm's stocks and bonds, as well
as the separate returns on stocks and bonds.
The distribution of returns on total market value are noticeably
different from the distributions for the returns on stocks but at a very
broad level they do move together. For the entire time period arithmetic
averages of the real rate of return from ownership of all claims to a firm
is only about 0.2 percentage points lower than from holding only stock.
The returns on bonds during this period are only slightly less than on
stocks. The riskiness of holding the entire firm is also less than from
holding stocks alone. Redistributive changes which simply shift real- 11-
returnsbetween stock holders and bond holders should affect stock and bond
returns, but not total return.
The last row of Table 3 gives the average time-series standard
deviations of the returns series. These are the weighted average of the
firm-by-firm standard deviation of returns. The standard deviation of
individual firms' stock returns is 29 percent, which is greater that the 24
percent standard deviation of the total return.
The mean real total return for our population of firms is approximately
one percentage point less than the total market return for the aggregate
shown in Table 3. Given the selection of our sample, it is not surprising
that the averages in our panel are below those of the aggregate; our sample
includes mature firms which may have relatively low return.
Table 3 also reports the mean and standard deviation of the real
returns from holding the common stock of firms in our sample. This series
shows a high correlation with the comparable rate of return (real capital
gains plus dividends) for the Standard and Poor's Composite shown in the
sixth column; 1981 is unusual in that our sample of firms did much worse
than the aggregate. The mean of our sample of firms' returns and the
aggregate index both show large fluctuations year to year. While the
average stock returns for our sample of firms are similar to those for the
aggregate, both conceal an enormous amount of variation in the returns to
individual firms. In the typical year, approximately a third of the stocks
have real returns which are more than 25 percent above or below the average.
The market rates of return are much more volatile than fundamentals.
The fundamental return varies a quarter to a third as much across firms as- 12-
thevarious market rates; the differences in the time-series variability of
returns is even more dramatic.
Differences in the average fundamental and total market returns are
also of interest. It was a conon view during the 1960's and 1970's, that
the productivity of physical capital, for the aggregate U.S. economy and for
the corporate sector was substantially in excess of the real returns
available on market claims to that capital. This also appears to be true nforour sample, the average fundamental return is over three percent
higher than the corresponding average total market return.
Table 4 compares book values with our estimates of economic or market
values used in our various calculations. Book profits are substantially in
excess of our estimates of economic profits, particularly during
inflationary periods. Again, primarily because of inflation, the book value
of net capital is substantially less than our estimates of its replacement
cost.
The figures for the market and book value of bonds are not surprising.
They show that the market value was less than book for almost all of this
period, as interest rates were for the most part rising during these years.
The ratio of market to book reached its lowest levels in the period of high
nominal interest rates of 1980 and 1981.- 13-
3.Relation of Firm Returns to Apzregate Returns
A.Market Risk and Fundamental Risk
Although there has been an enormous amount of theoretical work on
portfolio choice and risk since Tobin wrote his seminal paper "Liquidity
Preference as Behavior Towards Risk, empirical attempts to estimate risk
premia on securities would be quite understandable to someone who had read
nothing since that classic article, Tobin's Separation Theorem lies at the
foundation of modern finance. The familiar Sharpe-Lintner capital-asset
pricing model (CAPM) simply recognizes the equilibrium implications of the
portfolio separation derived in Tobin's original article.
That conventional CAPH relates risk premia on stock to undiversifiable
risk in the stock market itself. Our work takes a broader view of the
market. Risks that are priced should be undiversifiable, not just that
within the stock market, but in financial markets generally. As a first
step towards broadening the factor that is priced, we include aggregate
bonds together with aggregate stocks in a measure of the totalmarket.7
Including the return on the sum of debt and equity as a factor is a minimal
step toward encompassing the market.
At a theoretical level, the risk premium in financial markets should
reflect the correlation between asset returns and the marginal utility of
consumption. Under standard parametric assumptions on the utility function,
the appropriate measure of marginal utility is the growth in aggregate
consumption. An implementation of the CAPM based on aggregate consumption
data finds that consumption risk gets a much smaller price than does stock
7This approach to addressing Roll's critique of the CAPH is also taken
by Stambaugh (1982).- 14-
marketrisk, so we do not pursue that route here.8 Instead, we focus on
aggregate fundamental return as an alternative to aggregate market return as
a measure of risk. Variation in the fundamental return is indeed a
substantial component of the variation in economy-wide consumption
possibilities. Hence, this approach can be justified as an approximation to
a consumption-based pricing model. Indeed, the cash flows generated by
firms, our measure of fundamental return, might be better measures of the
consumption opportunities of their owners than is the NIPA consumption
data. These considerations of the appropriate measure of risk lead us to
compare the performance of financial and fundamental measures in explaining
the expected return on marketed assets. Alternatively, these variables
simply could be identified as priced factors in the arbitrage pricing
9
model.
We also depart from traditional implementations of the CAPH by
examining the risk premium on holding proportionately the firm's stocks and
bonds rather than just equity. While investigating the pricing of firm's
equity by itself is of inherent interest, it is not directly related to the
firm's decision to undertake a risky investment project. The firm should
discount the expected cash flows from these projects with a rate that takes
into account the price of bearing che riskiness of the cash flows)° The
conventional stock market beta does not provide the correct price of risk
for this calculation because the stock is not the claim on the project. The
8See Hankiw and Shapiro (1986).
9See Ross (1976). See Chen, Roll, and Ross(1986) fox an empirical
implementation.
105ee Brainard, Shoven, and Weiss(1980) for an analysis of risk-
adjustment in evaluating the present discounted value of a firm's cash flow.- 15-
stockbeta will, among other things, depend on leverage. If the investment
project has the same distribution of economic returns as the firm's existing
projects, the beta based on valuing the total market return of the firm
would give the appropriate measure of risk.
In this section of the paper, we compare both the betas of individual
firms' stock and total market returns on aggregate market and aggregate
fundamental returns. In the next section, we examine how these betas affect
the average market returns of these firms.
B.Market Beta and Fundamental Beta
In this section, we specify the betas that
pricing of risk. We consider three measures of
return, total market return (stocks plus bonds),
One or more of these measures is used to explain
or total market return.
The equations for defining the conventional
S S 55 S S
(1) nt —+ $ +
we will use to study the
aggregate risk: stock
and fundamental return.
either the firm-level stock
stock betas are
where is the stock return on the individual stock, is the aggregate
stock return, is the idiosyncratic component to the stock return, and
and are regression coefficients. Analogously with the stock market
beta we define a total market beta based on the measure of total return on
the marketed claims on the firm we introduced in the previous sub-section as
11 . .IJ
As a notationahconvention. we define fi.asthe slope coefficient
from regressing the icompany's I return on he aggregate J return where I
return and J return are stock, total, or fundamental return.- 16-
S S SV V S
(2) r. —a. + fi. +
where is the aggregate total return for our sample of firms. The
-coefficients or SV are measures of the riskiness of a firms equity
where the aggregate risk is either taken to come just from the stock market
or, more appropriately, from the total of marketed claims on firms.
As discussed above, we also want to examine the risk of holding all the
marketed claims on a firm's assets, both its equity and debt. Consequently,
we examine the beta defined by
V V VV V V
(3) nt —ai+
+
where rY is the total market return of firm i. it
In contrast with these market based measures of risk, we define
fundamental betas for both the firm-level stock and total market return.
These are
(Li) r5—cr+ PSFRF +
it i i t it
and
V V VF F V
(5) r. —a+ p.R+ c. it i it it
where is the aggregate fundamental return.- 17-
Whenwe turn in the next sections to examining the pricing of these
betas, we will want to relate jointly the market and fundamentals betas to
expected returns. To do this appropriately, the betas need to be defined
jointly as in
S S SS2 S SF2 F S
(6) r. — + + + tit
S S SV2V SF2 F S (7) — + + +
and
V V VV2 V VF2 F V
(8) ri — + fi. R+ + c.
Unless the market returns are orthogonal to the fundamental returns, the
betas defined in the bivariate regression (6)-(8) will differ from those in
the univariate regression (l)-(5).
The aggregate returns we uae in the empirical analysis are based an
aggregate data rather than averages of the firms in our sample. Use of
these aggregates is appropriate: the market should be measured as broadly
as possible. The aggregate stock return is the total return (dividend yield
plus capital gain) on Standard and Poor's composite. The aggregate bond
return is the coupon plus capital gain on ten-year Treasury bonds. This
measure captures interest rate risk, but not default riskJ2 The total
return is the weighted average of the stock and bond return using the
is calculated using the real capital gain on McCulloch's zero-
coupon bond series.- 18-
weightsreported in Table 3. The fundamental return is measured as
corporate profits from the NIPA (with the capital consumption and inventory
valuation adjustments divided the by total assets of the corporate sector
from the Flow of Funds Accounts. The stock and bond returns are deflated by
the rate of change of the GNP deflatorJ3
Table S gives summary statistics for the aggregate returns. For the
sample period of 1963 through 1985, the average annual return for stocks was
5.1 percent and for fundamental was 5.4 percent. The total return on the
firm is somewhat lower because of the lower return on bonds. The
fundamental return is much less variable than either the stock or total
return.
The correlations reported in Table 5 show that the fundamental return
is almost uncorrelated with either the stock or the total return.
Consequently, the univariate estimates of the betas for the fundamental
return and either the stock or total returns from equations (l)-(8) will
yield nearly numerically identical results to a regression where the
fundamental and one of the market factors were entered simultaneously. We
estimate the betas defined in equations (1)-(8) based on our sample of 191
firms with data from 1963 through 1985 and the aggregates just discussed.
The betas are estimated by ordinary least squares. A procedure that imposes
nonlinear, cross-equation restrictions is discussed below.
13The means and standard deviation of theaggregate returns and the
weighted average of the corresponding returns for our firms are similar.
Additionally, the correlations aggregate and firm-average measures of return
are .94 for stock, .90 for total, and .85 for fundamental.- 19-
C.What Factorsare Priced?
To study how risk and return are related, we examine the cross-section
relationship between average returns and the betas. The relationship has
been widely studied for the stock market, but analysis of the relationship
for the total market value and the fundamentals is new. Specifically, we





where ri is the average return (either stock or total market) for company i
over the time period 1963 to 1985 and where the regressor is the estimated
betas. The slope coefficients are estimates of the price of bearing the
systenatic risk reflected in the betas. The intercept estimates the risk-
free rate. We also estimate an equation introducing both betas which allows
the regression to attribute expected return to either market or fundamental
factors.
D.Econometric Issues
The standard procedure for estimating a market-line regression such as
(9) is to first estimate the betas from time-series regressions for the
individual stocks (such as equations (l)-(8)) and then estimate the risk
premia by regressing average returns on the estimated betas. This procedure
ignores the cross equation restriction implied by the equality of the risk-
free rate and the price of risks across stocks. The two-step procedure is
therefore inefficient. Moreover, least squares estimates of the cross-
section regression will be biased because the betas are generated- 20-
regressors.Previous work uses an instrumental variables procedure to
address this problem)4 Here, we estimate the betas and their prices
simultaneously to attenuate the bias.
The asset pricing model can be expressed as the nonlinear regression
(10) —rf
+ fli(R + A)' +
where i —1 N indexes firms, t —1 T indexes time. The variables
are —firm'sreturn and —(lxx)vector of aggregate factors, which
are understood to have zero mean. The parameters to be estimated are rf —
risk-freerate, A —(lxK)vector of prices of risk, and —(la)vector of
betas. The disturbances are mean zero and are serially and mutually
uncorrelated, but heteroskedastic. Note that the a. is equations (l)-(8) is
restricted by
(11) 0.— rf+ A,
which is just the expected return on asset i. In the cross-sectional
regression (9), a0 corresponds to rf and a1 corresponds to A.
Mechanically applying nonlinear least squares is computationally
intractable because of the large number of parameters (N(K+l)+l). We employ
an iterative procedure as follows. We first estimate the betas by a linear
regression of the aggregate factors on the returns firm-by-firm.(This
4Mankiw and Shapiro (1986) use betas estimated from one sub-sample as
instruments for betas estimated for another sub-sample. This procedure
does not work very well in practice because the estimated betas are very
unstable.- 21-
stepsolves the first-order conditions of NLLS for the parameters fi.)
Theseestimated betas are used to estimate the parameters rf and A where
the estimated betas are treated as fixed. (This step solves the first-order
conditions for the parameters rf and A). This procedure is iterated until
convergence. Since the converged estimates simultaneously solve the first-
order conditions, they are the NLLS estimatesJ5'16
3.Results
In this section, we report the OLSandNLLS estimates of the betas and
the prices that correspond to them.
A. Estimated Betas
Table 6A reports summary statistics for the betas estimated by ordinary
least squares. Table 6E reports the NLLS estimates. The tables contain the
average estimated beta and the average c-statistic for the estimated beta
for our panel of firms. The numbers is parenthesis are the sample standard
deviations of these cross-sectional estimates, not the standard errors of
the averages. They also report the correlation coefficients between the
various betas. The market betas ($ or ofcourse, have by
15The weighting matrix E is initially estimated from the residual
variances -of the firm-by-firm regressions of on a constant and the
factors. Once the iterative procedure just described converges, the
estimate of the weighting matrix is updated and the parameters are re-
estimated. This procedure is repeated until the coefficients converge.
This iteration is not required for efficiency of the estimation procedure,
but it may be preferable in finite sample to not iterating.
(1982) uses a linearization that is equivalent to the
procedure discussed in this section. McElroy and Burmeister (1988) use the
same estimator that we consider to study the arbitrage pricing model.- 22-
constructiona mean close to onej7 They are much less variable across
firms than are either of the fundamentals betas. Not surprisingly, the
correlation reported in Table 6 between the conventional stock market beta
and our total return beta is quite high because stock returns are the major
source of total return variation.
The low t-statistics of the estimated betas for the fundamentals betas
equations compared to those for the market beta equations suggests that the
fundamental factor explains relatively little of individual firms' stock or
total market returns. In Table 68 the average t-statistic for the betas in
the regression of either stock or total returns on the aggregate stock or
total returns are above three. When the explanatory variable in the
aggregate fundamental, the t-statistics average only about one. Much of the
difficulty in getting the aggregate fundamental to enter significantly in
the regressions can be traced to its low variance. The fundamentals betas
are, on average, estimated quite imprecisely. Their ability to explain
cross-sectional average return will consequently be impaired. The low
explanatory power of the fundamental factor in the time series regression
does imply that fundamentals play little role in explaining year-to-year
movements in returns.
There is some positive correlation between the market betas and the
fundamental betas. For example, the correlation of SS and SF is 0.34 when
we rely on the NLLS estimates. Given both the lack of correlation of the
aggregate market and fundamental factors and the imprecision of the
estimated fundamental betas, one might have expected less of relationship
noted above, we use broader estimates of the aggregate return than
average of returns for our sample, so the market betas need not average to
one.- 23-
betweenthe betas. Since both factors are positively related to expected
returns, the univariate NLLS squares procedure induces correlation between
the univariately estimated betas because they are chosen to explain expected
returns. The OLS estimates imply a negligible correlation of this pair of
betas, but these estimates are less efficient.18 The N1LS estimates of the
twofactormodel show, however, a small correlation between the market and
SS2 SF2
fundamental factor. Thecorrelationof and is -.07.
The lack of correlation between the aggregate market and fundamental
factors also implies that the univariate estimates of the betas should be
highly correlated with the bivarlate estimates. Indeed, these correlations
(between and SV2 SF and SF2 etc.) are over 0.98 for both the NLLS
and OLSestimates.
Finally, the correlations of the betas across estimators are quite
high. They are .97 for SS .97 for SV and .94 for forexample.
B.Estimated Risk Premia
The results of our comparison of risk and return are given in Table 7.
For each equation, we present the estimates based on regressing the betas
from unrestricted time-series regression on average returns (OLS). We also
present estimates that impose the nonlinear constraint discussed in the
previous section (NLLS). For both estimators, the equations are estimated
with a heteroskedasticity correction proportional to the idiosyncratic risk
(specifically the firm-specific variance of the estimated residuals from the
18The NLLS estimates roughly half the number of parameters to be
estimated. Thus those estimates of the betas are more reliable given that
the restriction we impose is not rejected.- 24-
time-seriesregression (11)). The heteroskedasticity arises because of the
sampling error in estimating expected returns.
The R2 reported for NLLS give the fraction of the cross-sectional
variation in average return explained. Neither the explained or unexplained
sum-of-squares reflect the period-by-period variation in firms' returns.
Thus, the OLS and NLLS are comparable. The statistic is problematic
for regression with heteroskedasticity. The statistic is not well-defined
because of the heterogeneity in the variance. Yet, it still is useful as a
summary of goodness of fit. We report the }(2 based on the unweighted
variables. It thus summarizes how well our equation fits for a firm without
taking into account any knowledge about its idiosyncratic variance. Because
the residuals need not have zero mean, the R2 can be negative.
The stock market premia scales the slope coefficients related to
market risk so they are comparable across equations. It gives the risk
premia for holding a portfolio perfectly correlated with the aggregate stock
market (namely with unit stock-market beta)J9 Because the correlation
between the aggregate stock market and the aggregate fundamental is
essentially zero, this adjustment implies, implausibly, that holding the
stock market is riskless when the measure of risk is the fundamentals beta.
In comparing the magnitudes of the coefficients of the market and
fundamentals beta it is important to keep in mind the differences in the
means of the variables. The market betas have means of between one and two,
while the fundamental betas have means from three to more than four.
Therefore, for equal values of their respective regression coefficients, the
19This correction is calculatedby multiplying the slope coefficient in
the market line regression by the beta obtained by regressing the aggregate
stock market return on the aggregate total return.- 25-
fundamentalbeta contributes twice as much of the mean of expected returns
as the market beta.
Lines 7.1 and 7.2 of Table 7 report the OLS and NLLS estimates of
regression of estimated expected returns on the stock-market betas. These
equations are analogous to the conventional empirical implementations of the
CAPM. The OLS estimates yield results quite similar to other
implementations of the CAPM. The point estimate of the risk-free rate is
about one percent although it is estimated imprecisely. The risk premia is
about five and one-half percent, which is also quite similar to other
estimates. The risk premium is estimated with about the same precision as
the risk-free rate. The standard error is small enough to overwhelming
reject zero, but the ninety-five percent confidence interval ranges from 2.7
to 7.9 percent, which is quite wide.
Recall that the OLS estimates are biased downward because the betas are
estimated. The NLLS estimates ameliorate this problem by reducing the
sampling error in the estimated betas and by restricting the intercepts in
the time-series representation of the pricing equation. The NLLS estimates
do make the regression line steeper: the intercept is lower and the slope
coefficient higher than in the OLS estimates. This outcome is precisely
what one should expect given attenuation of errors in variables bias. The
estimated negative risk-free rate is not significantly different from zero,
although it is significantly different from one. The risk premium of 8.53
is somewhat higher than the usual estimates. The high risk premium is just
the flip side of the negative risk-free rate. The expected return on the- 26-
marketimplied by the estimates in (7.2) is 6.0, compared with 6.4 in
(7.1)
20
Note that the NLLS estimates fit much better than the OLS ones. This
occurs in all the estimated equations, and is not a surprise. The NLLS
betas are chosen specifically to fit this equation well.
Line (7.3) and (7.4) report the estimates for the betas based on the
total market return (stocks plus bonds). The difference between the OLS and
NLLS estimates mirrors thoae for the stock-beta based estimates. The slope
coefficient in line (7.4) of 4.95 implies a risk premia for holding the
aggregate stock market of 6.83, which is somewhat below the value of 8.53
where the stock market itself is used to summarize aggregate risk. Yet,
given the size of the confidence hands on the slope coefficient, it would be
a mistake to read too much into these estimated differences in the price of
risk.
Lines (7.5) and (7.6) report the estimates that examine whether, taken
alone, the fundamental factor is priced. These results are also presented
in Figure 1. Note that the estimator jointly determines the slope of the
regression line and the betas, which are "explanatory variables" in the
cross-sectional representation of the regression. The NLLS procedure pulls
betas towards the regression line that are outliers in the OLS estimates.
The NLLS procedure thus ameliorates the errors-in-variables problem. The
figure clearly displays the steeper regression line and better fit for the
NLLS estimates.
20 .. ..
Wecan test the restriction (11) on the coefficients in the stock-
by-stock time series regressions. This restriction is not rejected. In
fact, the value of the test-statistic is very low. Given the imprecision of
the estimates of the firm-by-firm coefficients, this non-rejection should
not be taken as powerful support for the restriction.- 27
The fundamentals beta contributes little to the mean of the cross-
sectional distribution of expected returns of stocks because the
coefficients of the betas are small. In the OLS estimates, the coefficient
of the fundamentals risk is significantly different from zero. In the NLLS
estimates, although the estimated coefficient increases from 0.41 to 0.66,
the standard error increases more than proportionately. Hence, in the NLLS
estimates, the fundamentals factor is insignificantly different from zero
based on conventional critical values.21 Even taking into account that the
mean of the fundamentals betas is larger than that of the market betas, the
fundamentals account for little of the mean of expected returns. Put
differently, the risk free rate implied by the fundamentals betas
regressions are implausibly high.
The fundamentals betas explain less of the cross-sectional variation in
expected returns than do the market betas. Yet, at least in the NLLS
estimates reported in line 7.6, where the betas are chosen to improve the
fit, they do explain more than expected given how imprecisely they are
estimated. The R2 for that equation is 0.19, compared with 0.34 and 0.24
for the corresponding equations with the stock and total market betas. The
relatively high R2 for line (7.6) combined with its relatively low slope
coefficient is accounted for by the very high variability of fundamentals
betas.
Line (7.7) and (7.8) report the results of including both the total
21The NLLS procedure appropriately takes into account the joint
estimation of the betas and the prices of risk. The OLS standard errors are
conditional on the betas from the first stage.- 28-
marketand fundamentals betas in regressions on average returns.22 These
estimates of the market and fundamentals risk premia are somewhat lower than
in the respective univariate equations. There is enough sampling error that
the NLLS estimate of the market premia is insignificant. With the NLLS
estimate, the risk-free rate is estimated to be low, which means that the
risk premia associated with the betas are accounting for more of the average
expected returns. Overall, the patterns of the estimates from the
univariate estimates remains. Despite the small fundamental risk premium,
including the fundamentals beta raises the R2 from 0.24 in line (7.4) to
0.38 in line (7.8).
Lines (7.9) through (7.14) repeat the estimates of the risk premia, but
for the total assets of the firm rather than just its equity. In contrast
to the expected stock returns, the aggregate fundamental explains more of
the cross-sectional variation in return than does the total market
aggregate. Still, the coefficient of the fundamental betas are small. They
are insignificant in the NLLS estimates where we take into account their
joint estimation with the betas. In equation (7.14)) which includes hoth
the fundamental and market factors, more of the explanatory power does
however come from the fundamental factor. Given the imprecision of the
estimates of the fundamental betas, it is remarkable how much they do
explain in the NLLS estimates. In the OLS estimates, fundamentals are
highly significant despite the measurement error.
22The regressions including the two factor are basedon first-stage
regressions where both aggregate factors are included in the time-series
regressions. Given that the aggregate market factors are approximately
orthogonal to the aggregate fundamental factor (see Table 5), the betas from
the bivariate regressions are roughly equal to the ones estimated from the
univariate regressions.- 29-
Ourfinding that premia for holding financial claims are somewhat
better explained by market risks rather than fundamentals risks contrasts
with the finding that the consumption-risk also has a negligible price.
Mankiw and Shapiro (1986) compare risk premia estimated from market betas
and consumption betas. Notwithstanding theoretical arguments that imply
that aggregate consumption growth should mirror undiversifiable risk, they
find that consumption betas get very small coefficients in regressions.
While our results are weak in terms of conventional statistical
significance, Table 7 does show an important role for the fundamentals in
addition to market factors.
C.Multi-year Returns
The one-year horizon for returns used in the previous analysis is
arbitrary. Results using different horizons might differ for two reasons.
First, the relationship between the firm's asset returns and the aggregate
might differ for different horizons. Second, the pricing of risk at
different horizons might differ. Table 8 reports the results analogous to
those in Table 7, but where returns and the factors in the time-series
regressions are averaged over three years. The choice of three years is a
compromise between wanting to average over a long period and preserving
degrees of freedom.
The results provide support for the view that fundamentals do better in
explaining expected returns over the longer horizon. Overall, the estimates
are nore precise than for the one-year horizon. Except in the NLLS
estimates in line (8.2) and (8.10), the market premis are much smaller in- 30-
thelong horizon estimates. On the other hand, the point estimates of the
fundamental risk premium are somewhat larger. That, combined with the
increase in the precision of the estimates, makes the fundamental factors
significant in the NLLS estimates as well as in the OLS ones. In each of
the stock and total return equations with both market and fundamental
factors ((8.8) or (8.14)), most of the explanatory power comes from the
fundamental betas.
These results imply that over longer horizons fundamental risk is the
dominate factor in explaining expected returns om financial assets. The
results should not be over-emphasized. The estimates are unstable across
specifications and estimators; the total market beta seems to do
unexpectedly poorly with the averaging (its univariate estimates do not
converge).Yet, the fundamentals betas do explain an important part of
the distribution of expected returns.
4. Conclusions
A central theme of Tobin's work is the role of financial and
fundamental risk in the valuation of and the demand for marketed claims on
physical capital. In this paper, we follow his work by estimating the
extent to which risk premia depend on market and fundamental factors. Our
results square well with Tobin's view that much of the risk to ownership of
physical capital derives from financial-market fluctuations, but that it
also depends on fundamental risks, particularly when measured over longer
horizons. We find that both the market betas and fundamental betas have
important roles in explaining cross-sectional variation in expected returns.
Our results based on the longer horizons suggest, in contrast with other- 31-
studies,that fundamental factors are more important in accounting for the
distribution of expected returns than are market factors.- 32-
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FundamentalRates of Return
Cross Section of Firms Aggregate
Before Tax After Tax











13.5( 6.6)13.3 ( 8.5)
13.8 ( 6.5)13.6( 9.0)
9.8( 3.9)7.7( 4.9)














1964 13.9( 6.8)14.6( 8.8) 10.0( 3.9)8.5( 4.9) 6.9
1965 14.5( 7.0)15.4( 9.0) 10.3( 4.0)9.1( 5.0) 7.8
1966 14.5( 6.6)15.1( 8.3) 10.4( 3.8)8.9( 4.7) 7.9
1967 13.2( 6.8)13.0( 8.8) 9.8( 4.2)7.8( 5.4) 7.3
1968 14.5( 7.2)14.6( 9.1) 10.3( 4.1)8.3( 5.1) 6.5
1969 13.4( 6.4)13.0( 8.2) 9.7( 3.7)7.4( 4.6) 5.8
1970 12.0( 6.2)10.9( 8.2) 8.8( 3.7)6.2( 4.8) 4.8
1971 12.2( 5.8)11.2( 7.7) 8.8( 3.5)6.0( 4.5) 5.2
1972 12.8( 6.0)12.2( 8.0) 8.9( 3.6)6.6( 4.7) 5.6
1973 14.7( 6.1)15.2( 8.2) 9.8( 3.6)7.8( 4.6) 5.2
1974 16.5( 7.8)17.5(11.4) 9.4( 3.5)6.9( 4.5) 3.9
1975 12.9( 6.7)12.1( 9.7) 7.7( 3.4)4.3( 4.5) 4.4
1976 13.2( 5.6)12.7( 7.6) 8.4( 3.1)5.7( 3.8) 4.6
1977 13.1( 6.4)12.5( 8.7) 8.3( 3.5) 5.4( 4.6) 5.3
1978 13.2( 5.8)12.6( 7.9) 8.5( 3.3)5.5( 4.4) 5.3
1979 13.8( 6.6)13.5( 9.2) 8.7( 3.7) 5.8( 5.0) 4.8
1980 11.9( 6.4)10.6( 9.1) 7.6( 4.2)4.2( 5.9) 3.9
1981 10.7( 4.9) 9.0( 6.5) 7.4( 3.4) 4.1( 4.3) 4.3
1982 9.2( 5.9) 7.1( 8.1) 6.7( 3.9) 3.4( 5.4) 3.5
1983 10.2( 6.0) 8.8( 8.3) 7.4( 4.0) 4.6( 5.4) 4.6
1984 11.6( 6.3) 10.9( 8.7) 8.3( 4.2) 6.0( 5.8) 5.4
1985 10.9( 6.8) 9.9( 9.3) 7.9( 4.6) 5.3( 6.2) 5.4Table 1 (continued)
Note: Figures are mean returns for the sample of firms. Numbers in
parentheses are cross-sectional standard deviations. Cross-sectional
statistics are weighted by the share in the denominator of the respective
returns. Geometric means are for the indicated subsamples. The standard
errors given in the addendum are the weighted-average to the firm-by-firm
time-series standard errors.Table 2
q
q q(CEA)
1963 1.55 (1.14) 1.42
1964 1,66 ( 1.04) 1.52
1965 1.67 ( 1.22) 1.62
1966 1.33 (1.12) 1.47
1967 1.56 (1.52) 1.48
1968 1.55 (1.28) 1.52
1969 1.30 (1.37) 1.35
1970 1.20 (1.09) 1.09
1971 1.24 (1.17) 1.18
1972 1.36 ( 1.37) 1.26
1973 1.07 (0.91) 1.16
1974 0.67 (0.52) .83
1975 0.74 ( 0.51) .81
1976 0.82 (0.50) .91
1977 0.69 (0.42) .80
1978 0.64 (0.42) .76
1979 0.61 (0.35) .71
1980 0.61 ( 0.35) .67
1981 0.48 (0.29) .69
1982 0.55 ( 0.42) .69
1983 0.67 (0.48) na
1984 0.65 (0.44) na
1985 0.78 ( 054)
geometric means:
1963-1985 1.02 ( 0.80) 1.10
1966-1970 1.43 ( 127) 1.38
1971-1975 1.05 ( 0.93) 1.05
1976-1980 0.69 (0.42) .77
1981-1985 0.62 (0.42) na
Note: The variable q is the ratio of market value to replacement
costs. The first column report the average for our sample of firms with
cross-sectional standard deviations in parentheses. The last column gives
the value of q calculated from aggregate data by the Council of Economic





















See note to Table 1.
Cross-Section of Firm
RmdamentalTotalMarket Stock Bond Laverage
Re turn Return Re turn Return
196485 (4.9)12.8(14.7)13.8 (16.3) 2.4( 2.1)0.07 ( 11.8
19659.1 (5.0) 8.6(20.3) 9.2(22.1) 1.7( 2.6)0.07 (0.08) 6.2
14.8
9.1 19668.9 (4.7)-13.5(16.4)-14.3 (17.8) -4.4(2.5)0.10(0.10) -9.8
19677.8 (5.4)25.9(26.3)29.2(29.5) 1.4(2.3)0.10(0.09)12.4
19688.3 C 5.1)5.1(17.3)6.4(20.8)-4.8C 2.5)0.10
19697.4 ( 4.6)-10.4(18.3)-11.0(20.7)-5.7( 2.8)0.11 (0.12)-13.3
8.7
-16.0
19706.2 (4.8)-3.1(17.8)-3.1(20.3)-2.3( 3.1)0.13 (0.13)-0.8
1971 6.0 ( 4.5) 9.3(17.0)8.9(20.0)12.5( 2.3)0.13 ( 0.13)10.0 7.1
1972 6.4 (4.7) 15.3(14.5)17.6(16.4) 2.2(2.2)0.12(0.13) 12.3
1973 7.8 (4.6)-17.2(19.4)-19.0(22.2) -4.9(2.2)0.14(0.13) -13.2-22.8
1974 6.9 ( 4.5)-29.4(13.6)-33.1 (14.8) -7.5 ( 3.1) 0.20 (
197543 (4.5)20.0(18.7)25.0 (24.4) 1.8( 3.5)0.18 (0.14) 17.6
19765.7 (3.8)15.9(13.9) 17.8 (18.7) 7.7(2.8)
19775.4 (4.6) -9.6(11.2)-12.7 (13.8) 44C 2.2)0.20 (0.15) -4.2
15.8
-11.9
19785.5 (4.4) -0.2(10.8) 1.0 (13.4) -4.6C 2.1) 0.20 C -2.6
19795.8C 5.0)5.8(18.8)8.6(24.9)-4.4( 3.3)0.19 ( 0.13) 2.2
0.0
8.5 19804.2 (5.9)14.2(22.7)20.2(28.1)-10.3(4.5)0.16(0.12) 7.818.2 19814.1( 4.3)-31.0(20.8)-35.8(24.1)-5.7( 5.1)0.19 C 0.14)-2.8-9.9
1982 3.6( 5.4)15.7(26.4)14.8(33.7) 19.7( 7.6)0.20 ( 0.17)14.9










24.3 28.8 11.6Table 4
Book Values versus Econanic Values
Net Book ProfitsBook Value of BondsBook Value of Capital&oronsic
*











0.90 ( 4.19) 1.12 ( 0.03)
2.11 (15.60) 1.09 ( 0.03)
2.88 (13.58) 1.12 (0.04)
1.56 (6.76) 1.13( 0.08)
0.75 •(0.09) 0.09 (0.01)
0.66 (0.08) 0.09 ( 0.01)
0.63 (0.08) 0.10 (0.01)
0.67 (0.07) 0.10 (0.01)
1963 1.18( 0.92) 1.05( 0.01) 0.76( 0.11) 0.10( 0.01)
1964 1.52(3.00) 1.06(0.01) 0.76(0.10) 0.10(0.01)
1965 1.23(0.55) 1.05(0.02) 0.77(0.10) 0.09(0.01)
1966 1.18(1.05) 1.08(0.02) 0.76(0.09) 0.09(0.01)
1967 1.35(1.43) 1.08(0.02) 0.77(0.09) 0.09(0.01)
1968 0.45( 4.78) 1.10( 0.04) 0.76( 0.09) 0.09( 0.01)
1969 0.57(10.70) 1.16( 0.04) 0.74( 0.09) 0.09( 0.01)
1970 0.93(2.98) 1.18(0.05) 0.72(0.08) 0.09(0.01)
1971 1.48(3.55) 1.05(0.04) 0.70(0.08) 0.09(0.01)
1972 4.99(53.66) 1.05( 0.03) 0.68( 0.08) 0.09( 0.01)
1973 0.49(8.63) 1.10(0.03) 0.67(0.08) 0.09(0.01)
1974 2.67(6.43) 1.14(0.04) 0.64(0.08) 0.09(0.01)
1975 0.90(4.73) 1.12(0.06) 0.61(0.07) 0.09(0.01)
1976 2.01(16.25) 1.06( 0.03) 0.62( 0.07) 0.09( 0.01)
1977 3.04(11.98) 1.0'.( 0.03) 0.63( 0.07) 0.10( 0.01)
1978 1.77( 4.38) 1.09( 0.03) 0.63( 0.08) 0.10( 0.01)
1979 1.78(7.49) 1.14(0.04) 0.63(0.08) 0.10(0.01)
1980 5.79(27.80) 1.27( 0.07) 0.63( 0.08) 0.10( 0.01)
1981 2.21(12.94) 1.34( 0.12) 0.63( 0.06) 0.10( 0.01)
1982 237( 6.27) 1.19( 0.10) 0.65( 0.06) 0.10( 0.01)
1983 0.98( 4.66) 1.07( 0.08) 0.67( 0.06) 0.10( 0.01)
1984 1.46( 4.50) 1.09( 0,07) 0.70C 0.07) 0.10C 0.01)
1985 0.76 ( 5.61) 0.59C 0,05) 0)2( 0.0/) 0.10C 0,01)
geometricmeans:
1965- 1.79 8.87) 1.11 ( 0.04) 0,69C 0.08) 0.09 C 0.01)
1985









fundamental total stock bond
fundamental 1.00 -.02 .05 -.28
total i.oo .96 .60
stock 1.00 .36
bond 1.00Table 6A




1.75 (0.77) 3.03 (1.23)
SF 3.87 (6.70) 0.77 (0.70)
1.46 (0.54) 3.44(1.29)
3.57 (5.53) 0.82 (0.74)
SV2 1.76(0.77) 3.07 (1.22)
SF2 4.19(6.69) 0.94 (0.81)
W2 1.47 (0.54) 3.49 (1.26)
VF2 3.84 (5.54) 1.03 (0.86)
Correlationof EstimatedBetas
SS SV SF VV SV2 SF2 W2 flVF2
1.00
.96 1.00
SF .o -.10 1.00
.86 .90 -.04 1.00
VF .08 -.01 .95 .03 1.00
SV2 1.00 -.08 .90 .01 1.00
SF2 .00 -.08 1.00 -.02 .96 .06 1.00
flW2 .86 .90 -.02 1.00 .06 .90 .00 1.00
VF2 .09 .01 .95 .05 1.00 .03 .95 .07 1.00Table 68




1.80 (0.76) 3.41 (1.21)
0SF 4.41 (6.17) 0.90 (0.75)
1.50 (0.52) 3.96 (1.26)
VF 3.93 (5.18) 0.97 (0.80)
S1J2 1.78(0.79) 3.30 (1.25)
SF2 4.42 (6.37) 1.05 (0.86)
W2 1.48 (0.54) 3.73 (1.30)
19vF2 3.98 (5.30) 1.15 (0.93)
Correlation of Estimated Betas
SV SF VF SV2 SF2W2 VF2
1.00
.97 1.00
SF .34 .24 1.00
.87 .90 .32 1.00
lIP .37 .27 .97 .37 1.00
SV2 .94 .99 .10 .87 .13 1.00
SF2 .18 .08 .99 .17 .95 .07 1.00
.84 .89 .12 .98 .17 .90 -.02 1.00




















(1.15) (0.85) 1 (0.09)
1
— -0.97+3.78 +0.60vF2
(4.79) (3.52) 1 (0.39)
1















+ e 8.53 .34






























































Note: The left-hand side variables are time-series averages of the
returns. The betas are as defined in the note to Table 6. See the text for
an explanation of the OLS and NLLS estimators. The is the conventional
multiple correlation statistic based on the unweighted variables.Table 8
Market Line Regressions







































































































e. 1.33 .36Table S
(Continued)
*These estimates did notconverge after 100 iterations. Most others
converged in under 20 iterations.
Note: The returns are three-year averages. See also note to Table 7.L
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